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INTRODUCTION 
Legal education and the legal profession are widely perceived to be in 
the midst of turbulent, troubling times. The Great Recession has exacerbat-
ed or perhaps simply revealed what appears to be a colossal and fundamen-
tal market failure in the legal profession: too many lawyers out of work, and 
too many people and communities without legal services. The out-of-sight 
law school tuition increases and astronomical law graduate debt loads were 
easier to rationalize before the bottom fell out for law jobs for new gradu-
ates. Some commentators perceive a turning point for the profession and a 
crisis in legal education. 1 
The Michigan State Law Review is paying attention and moving these 
discussions several steps forward. This Symposium reminds us of our most 
important work, to protect legal institutions and the rule of law, and asks 
this most provocative question: Will 21st Century Business, Regulatory, and 
Educational Challenges Destroy the Lawyer's Role As Guardian of Legal 
Institutions and the Rule of Law? To some Symposium participants, the 
question posed is too dystopian. Is survival of the rule of law really at stake? 
For others, the Symposium question suggests a prior, even darker one: How 
* Dean and Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. I thank 
the Professors Bamhizer, David and Dan, for conceiving of and organizing this Symposium. 
I am also grateful for all the presenters and participants in the Symposium for enlarging my 
understanding of many of the vexing issues facing our profession. 
I. E.g., Symposium, Perspectives and Distinctions on the Future of Legal Educa-
tion, OHIO N.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012); Symposium, The Future of Legal Education, 96 
IOWAL.REv.l449(2011). 
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can we conserve what is already lost? How, indeed, will we conserve legal 
institutions and the role of law? Are we, as lawyers, up to this great task? If 
lawyers cannot do this work, who will? 
The answers collected here are varied in premise, method, and sub-
stance. Readers will find the existing legal institutions of professional regu-
lation and legal education passionately defended and equally passionately 
condemned. Market pressures are welcomed and denounced. The moods 
range from despair to delight, from alarm to steady confidence. The answers 
sometimes float on the romance of idealism, sometimes are driven by flinty 
realism, and sometimes proceed in simple, pragmatic, step-by-step forward 
motion. The common threads are expertise and a deep commitment to the 
importance ofthe Symposium's question. 
I was privileged to participate in the Symposium gathering, which 
brought together a vibrant collection of outstanding thinkers about the legal 
profession and legal education. The excitement of that gathering is now 
captured in this volume. My goal here is to introduce the contributions that 
follow, and then use the context of that work to present the metaphor that 
was my modest contribution to the Symposium, "Building the Justice App." 
I. THE CONTEXT OF CHANGE 
In his Symposium contribution, On the Declining Importance of Legal 
lnstitutions,2 keynote speaker Professor Thomas D. Morgan offers a mild 
challenge to the bold scale of the Symposium premise by suggesting that 
lawyers have never focused much on the rule of law, but rather on helping 
clients muddle through their problems. At the same time, Professor Mor-
gan's contribution enlarges the timeframe by addressing the pressures of the 
immediate past by considering the profession over the past fifty years. He 
posits five changes that have reduced lawyers' ability to guard the rule of 
law and legal institutions: judicial decisions that undermine "self-
regulation"; the increase in the number of lawyers reducing our sense of 
common purpose; globalization; information technology; and the changing 
roles and rising power of in-house counsel. Morgan counsels that lawyers 
are no longer in control of the legal system, if we ever were. Law is a public 
good, but is being privatized in our world of reduced government costs. 
Professor Morgan paints a compelling picture of a new world in which legal 
services are increasingly provided by entities, not individuals, but more 
individuals may be served. 
2. Thomas D. Morgan, On the Declining Importance of Legal Institutions, 2012 
MICH. ST. L. REv. 255. 
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II. TRUST AND DISTRUST FOR SELF-REGULATION 
Who should regulate the legal profession? Several contributors pro-
vide widely varying answers. For Solicitor Gordon Turriff (The Importance 
of Being Earnestly Independent)/ the clear answer is lawyers ourselves. 
Turriff is an unabashed purist about attorney independence from govern-
ment regulation, which he argues is crucial to the rule of law. Turriff uses 
the sad story of Oscar Wilde's downfall and disgrace4 to make his argument. 
Turriff suggests that Wilde's conviction followed his failure to tell his law-
yer the truth, because, perhaps, Wilde did not understand that the lawyer 
would have kept his secret. For Turriff, attorney independence from gov-
ernment regulation is required to protect an attorney's loyalty to his or her 
client. And an attorney's loyalty is a foundation for the profession. 
Professor James E. Moliterno (Crisis Regulation)5 does not share 
Turriff s confidence in keeping lawyers in charge of our own regulation. 
Indeed, Professor Moliterno is highly critical of what he argues is the Amer-
ican bar's self-serving, status-quo maintaining, crisis management version 
of self-regulation. Professor Moliterno argues that we solve problems with 
rather than against the flow of society, which for him means allowing non-
lawyers to regulate the legal profession. He describes the history of lawyer 
regulation as professional elites responding to immigrant lawyers and law-
yers representing workers by trying to eliminate contingent fees, advertis-
ing, and other mechanisms by which non-elites could practice law. Profes-
sor Moliterno brings equal skepticism to the latest American Bar Associa-
tion ethics efforts, which he describes as backwards looking, protective of 
the status quo, and unlikely to limit behavior of the elite lawyers. Professor 
Moliterno skewers legal education as well: "Medical education decided that 
its mission would be to create doctors; legal education decided that its mis-
sion would be to create law professors."6 
Far from trusting lawyers to protect the rule of law and legal institu-
tions, Symposium Co-Convenor Professor David Barnhizer's concern in 
Abandoning an "Unethical" System of Legal Ethics7 is protecting consum-
ers (clients) from lawyers. Professor Barnhizer' s contribution advocates for 
statutory protection for clients who suffer ethical violations of lawyers. Pro-
3. Gordon Turriff, The Importance of Being Earnestly Independent, 2012 MICH. 
ST. L. REv. 281. 
4. For legal scholarship considering Oscar Wilde, see Martha M. Ertman, Oscar 
Wilde: Paradoxical Poster Child for Both Identity and Post-Identity, 25 LAW & Soc. 
INQUIRY 153 (2000) and Joan W. Howarth, Adventures in Heteronormativity: The Straight 
Line from Liberace to Lawrence, 5 NEV. L.J. 260, 275 n.76 (2004). 
5. James E. Molitemo, Crisis Regulation, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REv. 307. 
6. !d. at 339. 
7. David Bamhizer, Abandoning an "Unethical" System of Legal Ethics, 2012 
MICH. ST. L. REv. 347. 
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fessor Barnhizer details lawyerly misdeeds and failures with the same com-
bination of passion and damning evidence that Ralph Nader used to con-
demn the automobile industry in Unsafe at Any Speed. 8 He is forceful and 
clear, "lawyers have betrayed their clients, are incapable of self-regulation, 
and ... an entirely new system of civil accountability needs to be put in 
place that is not wholly controlled by the bench and bar."9 The new system 
Professor Bamhizer proposes is a statutory consumer protection scheme of 
expectations regarding costs and outcomes of legal services. 
Professor Jack A. Guttenberg (Practicing Law in the Twenty-First 
Century in a Twentieth (Nineteenth) Century Straightjacket: Something Has 
to Give)10 shares Professor David Barnhizer's deep skepticism about law-
yers' self-policing. In Something Has to Give, Professor Guttenberg pre-
sents a full-throttle and comprehensive critique of lawyers' self-regulation 
as self-serving, inefficient, and self-righteous. Like Professor Morgan, Pro-
fessor Guttenberg notes the worsening conditions over forty years for attor-
neys representing people, rather than entities. Under Professor Guttenberg's 
analysis, the American bar's professionalism agenda of the twentieth centu-
ry was based on cartel protectionism, not protection of the client, in spite of 
ringing rhetoric to the contrary. 
After detailing pressures from almost every direction, Professor Gut-
tenberg uses service to clients as his touchstone and concludes that de-
regulation may serve clients better. He urges "change that will enhance 
competitiveness and efficiency, drive down costs, increase competence, 
provide greater access to legal assistance, and promote innovation in the 
delivery of legal services across the spectrum of clients." 11 
Professor Benjamin H. Barton also takes the movement toward dereg-
ulation of the U.S. legal profession very seriously. In Economists on Dereg-
ulation of the American Legal Profession: Praise and Critique, 12 Professor 
Barton performs the crucial role of two-way translator, applying economic 
analysis to the regulation of the legal profession, explaining economic prin-
ciples to lawyers, and teaching law to economists. Professor Barton's vehi-
cle is a careful and thoughtful critique of the strengths and weaknesses of a 
key new book by economists Clifford Winston, Robert Crandall, and 
Vikram Maheshri, First Thing We Do, Let's Deregulate All the Lawyers. 13 
Professor Barton reveals the importance and usefulness of some of this 
8. See generally RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965). 
9. Bamhizer, supra note 7 at 352. 
I 0. Jack A. Guttenberg, Practicing Law in the Twenty-First Century in a Twentieth 
(Nineteenth} Century Straightjacket: Something Has to Give, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REv. 415. 
II. /d. at 455. 
12. Benjamin H. Barton, Economists on Deregulation of the American Legal Profes-
sion: Praise and Critique, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 493. 
13. /d. at 499-506 (citing CLIFFORD WINSTON, ROBERT CRANDALL & VIKRAM 
MAHESHRI, FIRST THING WE DO, LET'S DEREGULATE ALL THE LAWYERS (2011)). 
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work, and also some fundamental misconceptions about the law that illus-
trate the potential pitfalls of cross-disciplinary critique. For example, Barton 
criticizes Let's Deregulate14 for seemingly not recognizing the deep stratifi-
cation of the legal profession, with big firms facing very different pressures 
and opportunities than other lawyers. Intriguingly, Professor Barton dis-
cusses data that suggest that the American public needs more lawyers, not 
fewer. 
III. RE-CONCEPTUALIZING PROFESSIONALISM 
Professors Russell G. Pearce and Eli Wald (Rethinking Lawyer Regu-
lation: How a Relational Approach Would Improve Rules and Roles) 15 are 
also reformers. Pearce and Wald propose a conceptual tum: legal profes-
sionalism should be understood to concern relationships, not autonomy. 
Their contribution rehabilitates a relational conception of professionalism, 
which they describe as being historically connected to the elitist stance of 
lawyers as wise counselors to the ignorant. Pearce and W ald re-
conceptualize legal professionalism away from autonomy toward relational-
ity in order to connect lawyers more deeply to the public good. They sug-
gest that the lesson of UK and Australian "principle-based" regulatory re-
gimes can be borrowed to enhance relational conceptions of lawyerly identi-
ty. Pearce and Wald's contribution seems consistent with the relational fem-
inist work of such legal scholars as Robin West16 and, in the legal ethics 
field, Susan Kupfer, 17 and may offer a conceptual challenge to the autono-
my-based conceptions of lawyers underlying other contributions to the 
Symposium, such as Dean Morant's18 and Solicitor Turriffs19• 
Whereas other participants embrace traditional notions of profession-
alism (e.g., Turriff0 and Moranf 1), and Pearce and Wald rework our con-
ception oflawyers' professionalism, in Will There Be Fallout from Clemen-
ti? The Repercussions for the Legal Profession After the Legal Services Act 
2007, Professor John Flood suggests that the very concept of professional-
ism is passe, or should be. He understands "professionalism" as a "taxo-
14. WINSTON, CRANDALL & MAHESHRI, supra note 13. 
15. Russell G. Pearce & Eli Wald, Rethinking Lawyer Regulation: How a Relational 
Approach Would Improve Rules and Roles, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 513. 
16. E.g., Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. I (1988). 
17. E.g., Susan G. Kupfer, Authentic Legal Practices, 10 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 33 
(1996). 
18. Blake D. Morant, Lawyers as Conservators and Guardians: Justice, the Rule of 
Law, and the Relevance of Sir Thomas More, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REv. 647. 
19. Turriff, supra note 3. 
20. ld. 
21. Morant, supra note 18. 
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nomic trope" that "triggers set responses without reflection.'m The rise of 
technical expertise will displace the "mythic power of law," including sym-
bolic "folk terms" such as professionalismY Professor Flood discusses the 
momentous changes in the regulation of the legal profession in the United 
Kingdom ("big bang in law") in the context of profound changes in funda-
mental concepts of work.24 Using the thought experiments of Tesco Law 
and Goldman Sachs Skadden, Professor Flood envisions concierge law ser-
vices for high-wealth individuals and families and the buying and selling of 
law firms in capital markets.25 Professor Flood presents a future created by 
new generations in which conceptions of our profession endure only in 
largely unrecognizable forms, replaced by post-modern networks and desta-
bilized categories. Professor Flood not only views this new world with op-
timism; he is impatient for its arrival. 
IV. LAW SCHOOLS AS CONSERVATORS OR DESTROYERS 
From his perspective as a former practicing attorney, former federal 
trial court judge, and now experienced federal appellate judge and veteran 
adjunct law professor, Sixth Circuit Judge David W. McKeague (Training 
Young Lawyers to Be Conservators of Legal Institutions & the Rule of 
Law)26 surveys the landscape of legal institutions-the judiciary, congress, 
state governments, and rests his attention on law schools. With pragmatism 
forged in experience, Judge McKeague concludes that law schools are best 
positioned to conserve legal institutions and the rule of law. Judge 
McKeague sees significant problems in legal education, but he also sees 
strength, and the promise of more. His critique is generally aimed at the 
potential tensions between a law school's identity as a scholarly enterprise 
and its role as educating for the profession. Judge McKeague's conclusion 
links the conservation of the rule of law and of legal institutions to the law 
school's renewed commitment to immersion in the profession and dedica-
tion to teaching professional values. 
Dean Steven R. Smith (Financing the Future of Legal Education: 
"Not What It Used to Be ")27 addresses the economic pressures facing law 
schools, and offers a strong defense of the value of American legal educa-
tion, even in today's economic turbulence. Dean Smith is optimistic that the 
22. John Flood, Will There Be Fallout from Clementi? The Repercussions for the 
Legal Profession After the Legal Services Act 2007, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REv. 537,565. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 537. 
25. Id. at 549. 
26. Hon. David W. McKeague, Training Young Lawyers To Be Conservators of 
Legal Institutions & the Rule of Law, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 567. 
27. Steven R. Smith, Financing the Future of Legal Education: "Not What It Used 
to Be," 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 579. 
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downturn in admissions is temporary. With the insider expertise of a veteran 
law school dean, Smith pinpoints a key budgetary challenge facing law 
schools. Law schools have gotten used to spending increases that far exceed 
inflation rates, meaning that we have grown accustomed to a world in which 
starting something new does not require terminating something else. Dean 
Smith suggests that the fundamental soundness of the legal education being 
offered means that law schools that find the discipline to modify those hab-
its will not just survive, but thrive. 
Professor Peter Toll Hoffman (Teaching Theory Versus Practice: Are 
We Training Lawyers or Plumbers?)28 is squarely within the category of 
legal education reformer. His message is that rather than perpetuating a 
false dichotomy of theory and skills, with legal education captured by the 
former, legal educators should recognize the theories imbedded in scholar-
ship and thinking about skills. He offers negotiation, a law school skill that 
has attracted extensive scholarly and theoretical attention, as an example, 
noting both the multi-disciplinary nature of negotiations scholarship, and 
the relative paucity of legal theory about negotiation. Professor Hoffman's 
central prescription is deceptively simple: legal educators should consider 
what law schools would look like if preparing students for the practice of 
law were the chief purpose. 
Dean Blake D. Morant (Lawyers as Conservators and Guardians: Jus-
tice, the Rule of Law, and the Relevance of Sir Thomas More)29 addresses 
the role of law schools in teaching professionalism and advocates the use of 
personal narrative to powerfully demonstrate the obligation of the lawyer to 
conserve the rule of law. By using the famous story of Sir Thomas More's 
self-sacrificing commitment to principle, Dean Morant reminds us that at its 
most basic, the rule of law means that law controls powerful people, not the 
reverse. Dean Morant mines the story of Thomas More to reinforce a heroic 
vision of a lawyer, identifying the strength of an individual's character as a 
bulwark against the institutional forces aligned against the profession. Using 
the story of an ethical challenge from his own career, Dean Morant suggests 
that the sturdiest foundation for the rule of law is a profession whose mem-
bers put principle above personal gain; law schools can reinforce or perhaps 
create those values in future lawyers with stories, famous or obscure, huge 
or modest, of lawyers who do just that. Dean Morant suggests that the cur-
rent storms are all the more reason to educate our students to be men and 
women for all seasons. 
Heroism is utterly absent from the vision of legal education presented 
in Symposium Co-convenor Professor Daniel D. Bamhizer's provocative 
contribution (Cultural Narratives of the Legal Profession: Law School, 
28. Peter Toll Hoffman, Teaching Theory Versus Practice: Are We Training Law-
yers or Plumbers?, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 625. 
29. Morant, supra note 18. 
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Scamblogs, Hopelessness, and the Rule of Law).30 Professor Bamhizer in-
vites us to swim in the muddy waters of the vast scamblogger movement-
angry, often crude, online indictments of legal education as an expensive 
scam on students for the benefit of law school deans and professors. Profes-
sor Bamhizer takes scambloggers seriously as a symptom and consequence 
of persistently irresponsible legal educators. Professor Barnhizer' s contribu-
tion not only describes but also performs scamblogging by appropriating 
scamblogger's methods, themes, style, and tone of passionate contempt. His 
deadly serious point is that contempt for law schools comes dangerously 
close to contempt for law, and the rule of law does not survive in a culture 
of contempt for law. Professor Barnhizer wants us to pay attention to the 
complaints of the scambloggers, not just to improve legal education, but 
also to protect the rule oflaw. 
Dean Smith's reminder that U.S. legal education is the envy of the 
world is supported by Izabela Krasnicka's contribution (Polish Legal Edu-
cation in the Light of the Recent Higher Education Reform),31 which de-
scribes the current state of legal education in Poland. The role of legal edu-
cators and lawyers in not just conserving but actually creating the rule of 
law is demonstrated in Professor Krasnicka's contribution, an account of the 
role of legal education in the great Polish project started in 1989 of creating 
a post-Soviet legal system. The economics of a Polish legal education-no 
tuition-would be the envy of American students. For those of us confront-
ing the U.S. problem of massive student debt, the strains from recent Polish 
reforms requiring fees for the first time in certain limited circumstances 
(such as when taking a course for the third time after twice failing) seem 
like quaint tales from an imaginary planet. Other current pressures recount-
ed by Professor Krasnicka-including the focus on new partnerships for 
funds and the pressure to monetize inventions and products-are utterly 
familiar. Professor Krasnicka deftly describes a multitude of challenges 
facing Polish law schools, including adapting to the newly-adopted con-
sumer protection device of student evaluations of their professors, imported 
from the United States, and a new scholarly focus on law review publica-
tions, with their established conventions. Thoughtful comparative work 
shines new light on even the very familiar aspects of home. For a minor 
example of the many revelations from this Essay, consider a new under-
standing of Bluebook citation as both icon and export of American legal 
culture. 
30. Daniel D. Bamhizer, Cultural Narratives of the Legal Profession: Law School, 
Scamblogs, Hopelessness and the Rule of Law, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REv. 663. 
31. Izabe1a Krasnicka, Polish Legal Education in the Light of the Recent Higher 
Education Reform, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REv. 691. 
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V. A NEW THREAT TO THE RULE OF LAW, AND A NEW OPPORTUNITY 
Professor Aviva Abramovsky's contribution, Justice for Sale: Con-
templations on the "Impartial" Judge in a Citizens United World,32 assesses 
the impact of Citizens Unitecf3 on judicial elections as a disaster for the rule 
of law. In her elegant and thoughtful contribution, Professor Abramovsky is 
a scholarly Paul Revere issuing an urgent warning: pouring unparalleled 
amounts of campaign contributions into judicial elections is incompatible 
with a judiciary that is perceived to be impartial. Impartiality and the per-
ception of impartiality are necessary preconditions for the widespread re-
spect for the judiciary required to maintain the rule of law. Professor 
Abramovsky shows that although the perception of judges being bought and 
sold is not new, the outsized impact of Citizens United is unprecedented.34 
Situated squarely within the reformist mode, Professor Laurel Terry's 
contribution, Preserving the Rule of Law in the 21st Century: The Im-
portance of Infrastructure and the Need to Create a Global Lawyer Regula-
tory Umbrella Organization,35 proposes a global regulatory organization as 
a mechanism to preserve the rule of law in the 21st century. Several other 
contributors (for example, Thomas D. Morgan,36 Steven R. Smith,37 Izabela 
Krasnicka38) notice the pressures of globalization. Professor Terry addresses 
those pressures and, in a martial arts move of redirecting pressure to mo-
mentum, uses them to construct a new organizational structure. Professor 
Terry builds her case with examples of other kinds of global regulatory um-
brella organizations, including existing ones for securities, antitrust, and 
labor regulators. 
Technology and globalization have spread common problems across 
the world. Professor Terry offers step-by-step instructions to move her pro-
posed umbrella organization closer to reality. Some passionate critics of 
current regulatory schemes (see, e.g., David Bamhizerl9 and James E. 
Molitemo's contributions40) may be dissatisfied with a proposal that could 
simply add a new layer of inadequate regulatory organization, or worse, 
spread the influence of flawed models. However, all should applaud Profes-
32. Aviva Abramovsky, Justice for Sale: Contemplations on the "Impartial" Judge 
in a Citizens United World, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REv. 713. 
33. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm 'n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
34. Abramovsky, supra note 32. 
35. Laurel Terry, Preserving the Rule of Law in the 21st Century: the Importance of 
Infrastructure and the Need to Create a Global Lawyer Regulatory Umbrella Organization, 
2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 735. 
36. Morgan, supra note 2. 
37. Smith, supra note 27. 
38. Krasnicka, supra note 31. 
39. Bamhizer, supra note 7. 
40. Molitemo, supra note 5. 
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sor Terry's careful attention to feasible plans to build a potentially important 
new legal institution, responsive to but undaunted by the serious challenges 
to existing legal institutions described in these pages. My own contribution 
is also a building project, but one whose feasibility is much less apparent 
than Professor's Terry's proposal. 
VI. BUILDING THE JUSTICE APP 
The Justice App addresses two looming problems. It is disruptive 
technology that reduces the injustice of so many Americans left without 
legal services. It also corrects the colossal market failure that leaves so 
many people in the United States without legal services, surrounded by an 
over-abundance of out-of-work lawyers. The Justice App is a metaphor and 
a dream. It is an optimistic vision of using technology to deliver legal ser-
vices in very different, but affordable ways. 
The widespread lack of affordable legal services for people of modest 
means is not a peripheral issue in discussions about conserving the rule of 
law and legal institutions. Where is the protection of the rule of law for peo-
ple without legal representation? Lawlessness is not just a kind of danger; it 
is also a kind of vulnerability. 
Similarly, what legal institution could be more important than a legal 
profession organized so that many (most?) lawyers earn decent livings han-
dling the legal problems of living persons (as opposed to entities)? The 
backdrop of the current crises in the profession and in legal education is the 
slow-motion emergency of the last forty years in which lawyer income be-
came relentlessly bimodal, with lawyers who represent people (as compared 
with entities) becoming less and less able to earn a good living. 
One traditional solution to the lack of access to lawyers would be to 
expand the constitutionally-required legal protections for poor people to 
civil matters, a push for a civil Gideon v. Wainwright. 41 Recognition of such 
a right would also create jobs for lawyers. In spite of my experience and 
orientation as a civil liberties attorney, extending Constitutional protections 
in that way is not my focus here. As contributors Professor Morgan and 
Judge McKeague have noted in different ways, we live in an era of dimin-
ishing state support for legal systems, not expansion. Also, even forty years 
after Gideon,42 meaningful Sixth Amendment protection remains elusive for 
too many poor people facing criminal prosecutions. A right to civil repre-
sentation at best reaches only the most indigent in very limited legal areas, 
and could take decades to fully implement. 
41. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
42. /d. 
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The Justice App is arguably a more realistic twenty-first century fanta-
sy: using technology to create market-based ways to make legal services 
accessible to those for whom lawyers are currently out of reach. The Justice 
App will deliver affordable, quality legal services to ordinary people on 
their telephones, or whatever super-smart and tiny device is next. (Pull-
down screens on contact lenses by 2025?) 
Technocrats imbued with entrepreneurial spirit and knowledge oflegal 
doctrine already are building legal apps. But without a commitment to rule 
of law and a serious professional duty to client welfare, law delivered to the 
masses through technology is to justice what a Big Mac is to nutrition. 
The Justice App is a bolder vision. Much of my inspiration as a legal 
educator comes from the power and beauty I have seen in the best attorney-
client relationships. For that reason, I imagine the Justice App as somehow 
creating a meaningful attorney-client relationship, even without a personal 
relationship. But perhaps the Justice App is just as likely to be a set of com-
plex networks connecting pro se individuals with a variety of planning, or-
dering, and dispute resolution mechanisms. 
I am far from the first to consider technology in this role.43 I am also 
not the first to consider what law school would look like if it embraced a 
mission very like that of educating the builders of the Justice App. Much of 
this conceptual work has been done by my colleague Professor Daniel Mar-
tin Katz in his paper, The MIT School of Law,44 another compelling meta-
phor. Who will build the Justice App? Technology geeks, imbued with not 
only entrepreneurial spirit and legal knowledge, but also abiding respect for 
the never-ending challenge of seeking and realizing justice. The builders of 
the Justice App will need a great legal education. 
The regulatory context of legal education enforces significant structur-
al impediments to creating a law school with the capacity to educate build-
ers of the Justice App. Current ABA Accreditation Standards, for example, 
impose severe limits on the number of credits a law student can take in 
online courses, a measure of the distrust of technology imbedded in the 
Standards. However real those structural constraints, the cultural restraints 
limiting legal education may be even more powerful. 
The dominant culture of legal education is to chase success and stature 
by imitation, not innovation.45 Consider the ABA accreditation standards 
43. E.g., RICHARD SUSSKIND, THE END OF LAWYERS? RETHINKING THE NATURE OF 
LEGAL SERVICES (20 I 0). 
44. Daniel Martin Katz, The MIT School of Law: A Perspective on Legal Education 
in the 21st Century, COMPUTATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES (Oct. 13, 2011), 
http:/ /computationallegalstudies.com/20 II /I 0/ 13/the-mit-school-of-law-a-perspective-on-
legal-education-in-the-21 st-century-presentation-slides-version-1-0 I/. 
45. Note the caustic joke about legal education that is almost as true today as when I 
heard it thirty years ago: "There are only three categories of law schools: the law schools that 
want to be Harvard, the law schools that think they are Harvard, and Harvard." 
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limitation of distance education to no more than twelve credits of an entire 
J.D. degree. This limitation is likely to disappear soon, in part because of 
the ubiquity of excellent online education, and in part because of the pres-
sure for mobility. But right now, very few law students graduate with their 
permissible twelve units of distance education. The impediment is the dom-
inant culture of legal education, not the accreditation standards. 
A commitment to seeking justice is a crucial foundation to both the 
rule of law and our most worthy legal institutions. This Symposium reminds 
us of the serious and seemingly insurmountable pressures facing the legal 
profession and legal education. The Justice App represents a vision of a 
future in which, perhaps against all odds, the financial, technological, and 
educational turbulence of today opens up new possibilities for lawyers to 
fortify the rule of law and do justice. 
